This article argues that the extent to which political office-holders can effectively attain and wield authority is a function of the stock of 'leadership capital.' Drawing on the concept of political capital, we define leadership capital as aggregate authority composed of three dimensions: skills; relations; and reputation of a leader. Leadership capital ebbs and flows over time within a trajectory of acquisition, expenditure and inevitable depreciation. We present a Leadership Capital Index (LCI) that systematically maps out the three broad areas combining concrete measures with interpretive aspects. This can be used as a tool for systematically tracking and comparing the political fortunes of leaders in a way that is both more nuanced and robust than exclusive reliance on the latest approval ratings. We offer an illustrative case study of Tony Blair demonstrating the LCI. We conclude by discerning several promising paths for future development of the LCI.
Political Leadership and Political Capital
Political commentators routinely refer to political capital as the degree of popularity (measured usually through opinion polls or votes), mandate or momentum enjoyed by professional politicians and leaders. Politicians themselves often refer to political capital when comparing their capacity to mobilize people with others (Schugurensky 2000: 5; Schier 2009 ). At a basic heuristic level the capital analogy allows us to understand the fundamental, but often overlooked, difference between office-holding and exercising leadership. Officeholding is about gathering and conserving leadership capital, leading is about spending it purposefully whilst retaining enough to survive, recharge and continue. Exercising leadership involves laying one's authority on the line to 'teach reality' (Hargrove 1998) , to 'disappoint followers at a rate they can stand' (Heifetz, 1994) , to 'regulate distress' among stakeholders and publics in order to get them to do the often painful 'adaptive work' involved in coping with complex changes and wicked problems, for which no leader or government can devise and impose ready-made solutions (Heifetz et al, 2009) . What really counts is not one's formal position but the informal authority one gets granted.
With so much riding on it, it becomes relevant to be able to assess the state of a leader's authority in a way that is valid and parsimonious and yet sensitive to its socially constructed and often fluid character. In this article we deploy an analogy from the world of finance and economics and conceive of political authority as 'capital', thus opening a different set of connotations and methodologies. Leadership capital is taken to be the aggregate of a leader's political resources: skills (both 'hard' and 'soft' see Nye 2008) , relations and reputation. We first examine the theoretical roots of the concept. We then present three main forms of leadership capital, before introducing the Leadership Capital Index (LCI), discussing its use and demonstrating its application through an illustrative case study of Tony Blair's second term in office. We conclude by outlining avenues for further application and development of the LCI.
Varieties of Capital
Capital is recognised as 'a surplus, something that you have beyond sufficiency that enables you to do something else of value' (Renshon 2000: 203) . Pierre Bourdieu conceptualised three fundamental guises of capital as: economic (money and property), cultural (cultural goods and services including educational credentials), and social (acquaintances and networks) (Bourdieu 1986: 242) . The latter has spawned more than 4000 academic studies, largely on the back of Robert Putnam's influential works, examining its measurement and effects (Campbell 2013: 29) . Bourdieu (1986 Bourdieu ( , 2005 ) also discerned political capital, a manifestation less developed than the other three forms of 'capital' he had initially presented. He described it as:
A form of symbolic capital, credit founded on credence or belief and recognition or, more precisely, on the innumerable operations of credit by which agents confer on a person (or on an object) the very powers that they recognize in him (or it) (in Schugurensky 2000: 4).
To Bourdieu the aim of political power is to 'impose beliefs ' and 'recognized principles' (2005: 39) . To do so, he explained, 'one needs to be credible, to command credit, to have accumulated a capital of belief, of specific authority' (Bourdieu 2005, 39 , our emphasis). It also requires differentiation, to create a 'distinctive, differential capital' that allows the politician to stand out (2005: 39) . To understand a politician's position requires analysis of their background, their 'relations of dependence' with other powerful actors or groups and their 'position in the political game' whether a purist political actor, remote from the world or one connected to other 'fields ' (2005: 34) . Bourdieu highlights the ambiguous position of political capital as both symbolic and concrete power. Sometimes political capital is 'symbolic power ….an aggregate reflection of other capital forms possessed by powerful institutions and actors (meta-capital)' while 'elsewhere…it becomes something to be accumulated as a capital form' (Davis and Seymour 2010: 741) . Notwithstanding this ambiguity, what is essential is that political capital is in part self-reinforcing (or selfdestructing) as 'authority…comes in part from the effect that it produces' (Bourdieu 2005: 39).
Bourdieu's ideas enable us to identify three key points about the nature of political capital.
First, having skills to become and remain a political leader is crucial. The process of leadership ascendancy begins as 'individual politicians make use of their capital forms in order to win…struggles and progress within political hierarchies' to achieve power, creating a 'distinctive' image and path (Davis and Seymour 2010: 742; Bourdieu 2005: 39) . It then follows that leadership consists of a 'continuous…struggle' to 'maintain ascendancy' (Davis and Seymour 2010: 741) .
Second, political capital is relational. Bourdieu saw 'political power' as being 'derived by politicians from trust (expressed in a form of credit)' from the public, though he viewed it as a capacity 'to mobilise' (Schugurensky 2000: 4) . This connects political capital to public perceptions, with the media being a crucial linchpin between the two (Davis and Seymour 2010: 742) . Here a comparison can be again drawn with social capital, which is seen as a dense network of 'credit' (Coleman 1988) , not unlike what novelist Tom Wolfe (1987) famously described as the 'favor bank': "Well, everything in this building . . . operates on favors. Everybody does favors for everybody else. Every chance they get, they make deposits in the Favor Bank. A deposit in the Favor Bank is not a quid pro quo. It's saving up for a rainy day…" So, relations and networks matter in the generation of political capital.
Third, to Bourdieu low levels of public interest in the political process mean that political capital becomes an elite, leader and party centred pursuit with 'politics…concentrated in the hands of professional politicians and bureaucrats, lead [ing] him to identify political capital only among political leaders or parties' (Schugurensky 2000: 4) . Once it is acquired, capital becomes part of a reputational cycle, a reciprocal process of leaders presenting ideas, undertaking actions and 'getting things done'. Political capital is thus continually 'contested' and fought over by the media, public and politicians. Political capital is dynamic and contingent and can 'be conserved only at the cost of unceasing work which is necessary both to accumulate credit and to avoid discredit…before the tribunal of public opinion' (Bourdieu, in Schugurensky 2000: 5; Davis and Seymour 2010: 742) .
Various interpretations of political capital have been offered. It has been theorised as a 'vertical' version of 'horizontal' social capital or as a developing and dynamic relationship between politician and citizen (see Seyd and Whiteley 1997; Novicevic and Harvey 2004 ).
We present a systemic tool drawn from such theoretical approaches.
Leadership Capital
It is important to differentiate between political capital and leadership capital. Political capital (as Bourdieu conceptualises above) is associated with horizontal bonds of networks, relations and trust that are inherited, hoarded, and often cultivated to gain vertical political credit. Leadership capital may draw on such horizontal foundations but it only applies to those in leadership positions. It is more focused on how constituents confer authority on a particular office-holder who then uses it. It evolves from and parallel with attributions associated with the personal qualities of these office-holders, i.e. their perceived 'competence, integrity and capacities for leadership' (Renshon 2000: 200) . Depending on how firmly and widely such perceptions are shared in a polity; the leadership capital of an office-holder can be 'accumulated or depleted' (ibid). As such, it is not a personal attribute of a leader, but a socially granted zone in which they can exercise leadership as defined above.
John Kane (2001) , for example, has tied a leader's capital to the establishment of moral authority (Kane, 2001) . In examining the political capital of George W. Bush, Schier (2009) defined capital as a combination of formal and informal power, a mix of 'party support of the president in Congress, public approval of the president's conduct of his job, the President's electoral margin and patronage appointments' (Schier 2009: 5) .
The notion of leadership capital allows us to see the difference between being in office and being in power. In contemporary politics, leaders are held to be ever more centre stage, but also more constrained and vulnerable (Helms 2012b: 660) . Executive leadership studies have tended to focus on the power mechanisms that structure the governance environment within which leaders operate. Such formal mechanisms may include the ability to hire and fire, formal constitutional powers, the capacity to organise at the centre and the level of administrative support (Rockman 1997 (Rockman , 2003 Rose 1980 , Peters and Helms 2012 . The institutional context will differ and be dependent on the type of system. Presidents may have extensive patronage powers, but as in the United States they have to compete with a well funded and autonomous legislature. Prime ministers in coalition may be constrained by electoral mechanisms and power sharing agreements, as in most West European countries.
Studying political leadership through the lens of leadership capital presumes that it is the dynamic interplay between individual capabilities and contextual conditions that shapes leaders' ability to act and determines their legacies (Hargrove 2002: 199; Hargrove and Owen 2003) . Also, political psychologists have discovered that some leaders' personality characteristics predispose them to accept contextual constraints as given, whereas others are more predisposed to challenge them (Keller, 2005; Antonakis 2011; Davis and Gardner 2012 ). Yet situations are never a given. Things happening 'out there' are perceived and understood differently by political actors: 'the economy', 'the Zeitgeist' or 'the geostrategic situations' are assigned meaning in media stories which are framed in particular ways -often with strategic intent. Such meaning-making contests are pivotal in mediating the effects of situations upon leaders' capital (see Skowronek 1993 Skowronek , 2010 't Hart and Uhr 2011; Laing and McCaffrie 2013; 't Hart 2014) . The view of these narratives themselves may also shift over time: Thatcher and Reagan's 'pro-free market small state' narrative is viewed differently post 2007 crash than it was in the boom years of the late 1990s. The combination of skills, relations and reputation offers a way into understanding this.
Institutional parameters vary, as can the situational context within which the leader must operate. Elgie (1995) sensibly proposed an interactionist approach, combining the personal and systemic aspects of the leadership process, whereby political leaders operate within an environment 'which will both structure their behaviour and constrain their freedom of action'. This implies that 'political leaders do have the opportunity to shape the environment in which they operate' (Helms 2005) , or as Riker (1986: ix) put it 'structuring situations so you can win' only when the leadership environment actually allows such restructuring (see Greenstein, 1969; Hargrove and Owens, 2003) . But to do so, they need not just skills but authority, conceived of here as a warrant to challenge and alter institutional traditions and path dependencies. Leadership capital provides a measure for what one might call the 'aggregate authorisation' a political actor enjoys from his 'authorizing environment' (Moore, 1995) , in other words a composite measure of their warrant to lead. Having a healthy 'stock' of leadership capital confers on leaders the power to sway decision-making processes, to persuade publics and to convene, stakeholders otherwise reluctant to engage in dialogue. In short, it enhances their ability to confront and resolve dilemmas (Renshon 2000: 223) . (Daleus, 2012) . His effort is just one among many who have tried to capture key dimensions of politicians' leadership styles and skills and to develop them into predictive and/or evaluative performance assessment instruments (Kaarbo, 1997; Preston, 2001; Cronin 2008; Post, 2005; Hermann, 2013 ; see also Nye, 2008) . 
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leader's skills, here pragmatically separated into 'hard' (unilateral and transactional) and 'soft' (persuasive and inspirational) skills (Nye 2008: 83) .
Relational capital refers to the loyalties that leaders mobilise. Why people follow or at least accept that leaders matters a great deal in shaping the authority and influence of leaders.
Some leader-constituent relationships are characterized by fierce, unconditional and enduring loyalty. In case of charismatic leadership, constituents become fully formed 'followers' whose loyalty is unconditional, indeed 'blind' Gardner 2012, Aviolo and Yammarino 2013) . Other leader-follower relationships are much more cerebral, contingent and ephemeral. Understanding leadership, in other words, involves grasping the 'dynamic interplay of wants, needs, motives, values, and capacities of both would-be leaders and their potential followers' (Burns 2003: 16) . Social psychology and sociology provide a rich reservoir of insights about the composition, social categorizations and identifications, and leadership expectations of followers and constituents. These are key to understanding the nature of the psychological contract that develops between them and their representatives (Cronin 2008; Reicher et al, 2010) . This contract extends beyond the circle of party members or movement followers. It can also be usefully applied to capture the relations between leaders and the media and the wider electorate (Davis 2010) .
Leadership relations differ in the kind of psychological contract that underpins them. Burns (1978) picked up on this in making his classic distinction between transformational and transactional leaders, but by now there are many other salient distinctions (Brett 2009; Reicher et al 2014) . The 'visionary', transformational leader first and foremost hopes to gather capital through a mobilizing story of ideals and aspirations, and is prepared to risk the political costs of ideological opposition to it and of delivered realities falling short of evoked expectations. In contrast, pragmatic, transactional leaders bank primarily on acquiring capital through technical competence and tangible achievements at the risk of leaving a vacuum of meaning and identification for their political competitors to fill. This stylistic divide cuts across holders of the same political office.
Each type of leadership claim sets up its own performance test. Moralizing leaders need 'to walk their talk'. Idealist leaders need to be seen to be taking risks and making sacrifices for the values they believe in. Pragmatists need to demonstrate competence and 'bring home the bacon'. This brings us to the third component: reputational capital. Leaders' words and deeds are constantly monitored and assessed. Followers, observers and critics alike all try to distil a 'narrative' about what a leader 'is really like' from the pattern of that leader's behaviour and its observable impact. For each leader such a narrative emerges. Though only partially shaped and controlled by the leader herself. This narrative forms the core of a leader's reputation. A leader's reputation increases leadership capital when it meets two conditions: its normative core is seen by the observer as appropriate for the times; and the gap between perceived promise and observed performance is seen as limited or caused by exogenous, temporary circumstances. Effective reputations are coherent believable narratives in which a leader's life story, espoused philosophy and observable in-office behaviour are widely deemed to be in alignment.
The Leadership Capital Index
The Leadership Capital Index (LCI) is a diagnostic 'checklist' tool for assessing a political leader's 'stock' of authority. It is designed to help us spot key variations in the nature and aggregate volume of leadership capital. It can be applied to discrete leaders, but also in a comparative, 'league table' fashion. It offers a 'snap shot' at a particular point or period, but when applied repeatedly over the course of a leader's tenure, it helps document the ebb and flow of their authority over time. The index is conceptualised as the sum of the 'scores' leaders achieve on the three elements presented above: skills, relations and reputation. The LCI merges perceptual categories with observable performance data (e.g. electoral and legislative record).
The LCI assesses leadership authority as an aggregate of (perceived) skills, relations and reputation. The point of the exercise is that the LCI has the potential to generate a more nuanced picture of a leader's 'license to operate', both in time and over time, than the common job approval and poll ratings are able to provide. Users of the index can decide whether and how to accord weights to each of these three criteria sets. Table 1 offers one way of operationalising the LCI. The indicators were chosen by a process of reduction, distilling a vast array of variables often used to assess political leadership down to a manageable number of ten core indicators. The variables relate to the three aspects of leadership capital defined above. Some act as 'proxies' to assess electoral skill. This underpins the Index with a level of coherence and parsimony. Most indicators relate to a perceptual element and thus involve either public opinion / constituent data, or require some form of intersubjective agreement among analysts (e.g. by using expert panels or parallel coding). Where data is limited or unavailable, it may be that other proxies are used such as approval rating for trust. Once the analysis is undertaken, the data can then be 'scored' to allow a rating of a leader on the LCI. A provisional overall interpretive assessment is given in Table   2 with illustrative examples leaders arguably fitting into the various categories. As with the 'natural rate of governability' some of the subjective measures are contextdependent (Buller and James 2012; Bulpitt 1986) . What are considered assets (skills, achievements or victories) in one setting may not be in another setting. This may vary from person to person or group to group: Renshon (2000: 208) speaks of there being not one but 'several' public 'psychologies' assessing leaders. Renshon (2000: 207) argues that building capital is not all catch-all race for the widest support: one leader as a unifier (a Churchill) may build capital through widening 'national' support: others (a Thatcher) may do so through division and strengthening a 'core' support of particular groups.
.
Utilising and Interpreting the Leadership Capital Index
Much work is still required to develop alternative and complementary operationalisations of the LCI for different classes of political office-holders (heads of government, ministers, opposition leaders, senior legislators). Whilst the LCI presents a potential starting point for new approaches to understanding and evaluating political leadership, it is worth reflecting a little more on the potential applications of LCI-based analyses in the study of political leadership.
The trajectory of leadership capital
Leadership capital can be assessed as a snapshot (at time T) or as a film (trajectory T1->Tx with various markers in between T2, T3, T4 etc). The latter opens up the opportunity for empirical testing of the long-established assertion that leadership tenures follow roughly three developmental stages: acquiring, managing, and losing leadership capital (Breslauer, 2002: 13) . Each leadership trajectory is said to evolve through these stages, though not necessarily in linear or predictable fashion. Leadership capital gathering requires a struggle to the top, as with Bourdieu's political capital. Acquiring enough leadership capital to obtain high office is just the start. Capital must thus be leveraged to 'make a difference' in public policy while one can. It takes time, skill and luck to accumulate (Davis and Seymour 2010) . That being the case, leaders can only spend it every so often. However, unlike financial capital, which prudent managers can sustain over very long periods of time, political leaders experience growing tension between their desire to lead and the near-inevitable growing downward pressure on their capital.
Leaders may score highly in the daily battle, but lose in the long-term: Gordon Brown was famously a tactician, spending capital day-to-day to 'win' but failed to deploy it strategically (Seldon and Lodge 2010) . Australian Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam articulated one of the most ambitious and far-reaching policy visions in recent memory for his 1972 government, but squandered the capital it conferred in three years through inept management of the day-to-day governmental process (Walter 1980) . Time has a way of dumping the occasional fiasco, scandal or external crisis on a leader's doorstep. These provide high-stakes performance tests and 'blame games' at an altogether different level of intensity, which will see some leaders thrive and others flounder (Boin et al, 2005 (Boin et al, , 2008 .
Nuances aside, the iron law of democratic politics is that even great political skills and propitious political and economic contexts cannot halt the inevitable (though not monotonous or steep) decline of a leader's authority. The natural 'trajectory' of leadership capital is one of eventual deprecation: even those office-holders who seek to hoard it, tend to see it severely diminished in the end -with media, former allies, party barons, organised interests and voters deciding the time has come for them to move on. The tension between hoarding and spending capital and the impact of what one might call the natural rate of capital attrition over time becomes progressively more difficult to manage, to the point that a very large percentage of all democratic party and government leaders are forced one way or the other to leave office before they themselves feel ready (Laing and 't Hart 2011) . Denver and Garnett's (2012: 71) meta-analysis of opinion polling data found 'it is certainly the case that all prime ministers leave office less popular then when they began. Most have ups and downs… but in the end the trend is inexorably downwards'. An ideal typical depiction of this trajectory would present an arc of leadership capital, within which the LCI may be plotted over the leadership tenure, as ascendance precedes performance, and eventual political decline. The evolution of leadership capital can be identified along the lines therefore of an inverted U trajectory ('t Hart and Bynander 2006: 722).
As noted above, the LCI can be utilised to plot the diachronic trajectory of various leader to test whether this general assertion is correct, who might be exempt from it, as well as to explore if there are typical patterns of leadership capital evolution. The next step in the analysis is then to explore the correlates or ideally the causes of such variations. From a short-term perspective strong leadership capital should enable leaders both to momentarily survive in office and exercise effective leadership (i.e. putting hitherto neglected issues on the political agenda, getting major policy changes adopted or delivering institutional reforms). From a long-term perspective on office-holding, high levels of leadership capital should be associated with a lack of internal competitors, low levels of intraparty factionalism, stable and robust legislative majorities, successful re-election and thus long lasting leaders tenures.
Using the LCI: The example of Tony Blair, June 2001 -May 2005
To demonstrate the applicability of the LCI, the following analysis examines Tony Blair offers a particularly fruitful area. Not only is there voluminous assessment of his time in office and legacy but also detailed studies of his parliamentary party (Cowley 2005) , media perceptions and trust (Karp et al 2011 (Karp et al : 2012 his own autobiography (Blair 2010 ) and academic and popular research into his legacy (Bennister 2009 (Bennister , 2012 Theakston 2012) . The approach taken here is not intended to be prescriptive, but offers an example of a way in which it can be done. 
S1 Vision and Communication
Blair was widely recognised during his premiership as a 'transformist' in vision (Hennessy 2001; Seldon 2005) . In 2001, Blair promised a 'radical' second term that included farreaching public service reform, democratic renewal and taking the UK into the Euro (Seldon 2005: 466-467) . It became clear that Blair, lacked a 'concise agenda' and had a tendency to become a 'crisis manager and headline seeker' (Kavanagh 2005: 16) had 'learned much' in his first five years and he and his team were 'seasoned', aided by a 'stronger centre' and growing institutional capacity (Kavanagh 2005 ). Yet his 'lack of strategy', informal decision making habits and conflict with Brown were also set as dysfunctional patterns (Seldon 2005) . His election as party leader was 11 years in the past and largely irrelevant, especially given the growing challenge from Brown (Kelly et (Seldon 2007 : 337: Kavanagh 2005 . Relations deteriorated severely in the second term, creating a deeply divided government, fragmented into warring factions and party loyalty moving to Brown (Kavanagh 2005) . By 2004-05 Blair felt that the Labour Party saw him as an 'albatross' and felt they could 'renew under Brown' (2010: 510-511 (Blair 2010) .
R2 Policy and Parliament
Blair's promises of radicalism were seen to fall short. Although manifesto commitments were met and NHS and higher education reforms and poverty reduction were clear markers of success, much of the responsibility lay with Brown (Buller and James 2012, 18) . Promised democratic renewal was undermined by 'muddy planning' and 'poor execution' of constitutional reform (Seldon 2005: 421) to NHS reform, immigration and anti-terrorism powers (Cowley and Stuart 2005: 39) .
Although the defeats rarely seriously hampered the government, they led to policy shifts and were 'politically costly' in symbolic terms and 'self-perpetuating' in encouraging further rebellion (Cowley and Stuart 2005: 41) .
Blair: The Analysis
Few second term governments 'enhance their reputation' as support becomes 'stale' and opposition increases (Kavanagh 2005: 3; Norris 2005: 44) . Nevertheless, Blair began his term with almost perfect conditions for a 'weather-making' premiership with a 'large majority, goodwill, economic stability and a 'feeble opposition': few leaders have had a more 'favourable context' (Kavanagh 2005: 19; Buller and James 2012: 18 ). Yet Blair's capital declined sharply in 2003 and only slightly revived. In examining the loss of leadership capital, it is clear that Iraq is the key event, comparable with Thatcher's poll tax. Iraq undermined Blair's skills, meaning his strong communicative skills had declining effect on a sceptical public and unhappy party. It also strengthened his restive challenger. Blair's weakness over Iraq was intertwined with the 'Blair/Brown division' which split policy into 'fiefdoms' and had a 'fundamental impact' on Blair's ability to govern (Richards 2011: 35-36 ). Brown's challenge and status as 'leader-in-waiting' was strengthened by Iraq, as Blair admitted (Blair 2010: 511) .
The loss was also down to Blair himself. Blair believed he retained more power than he did:
Barber claimed that Blair felt that 'through the exercise of his own formidable powers of persuasion, he could achieve almost anything' (Barber 2007, 305 (Cowley 2005 ). Yet Blair's key 'strength' was one of fortune: the weakness of the Conservative opposition, which had 'flat-lined' and remained in 'disarray' throughout the second term (Norris 2007, 45) . Better opposition leaders could have offered an alternative narrative and better exploited Blair's weaknesses: both the Iraq rebellion or Euro u-turn, instead of offering a chance to severely 'damage' Blair, also exposed Conservative divisions (Cowley 2005) .
While academics agree Iraq undermined Blair's leadership, the LCI demonstrates how. It triggered a self-reinforcing 'chain reaction' across Blair's skills, relations and reputation.
Blair himself acknowledges that the party was rebellious partly because of the strength of his rival and partly because of Iraq (Blair 2010 So what kept Blair in power? His skills, structural advantage and poor opposition-though each was isolated and could not positively feedback. His personal skills remained, though they diminished because they lacked traction among a sceptical public and party. Blair's majority was a great structural advantage, though also subject to diminishing returns due to rebellion. Most importantly, Blair was sustained by a poor and less popular opposition. It was perhaps the latter factor that allowed Blair to regain capital-giving him the space to fall in popularity, weather rebellions and the opportunity to 'promise' to 'stand down', that gave him the time and space to push a new agenda and seek, with some success, to pass new policies. Seldon's (2007) claim that Blair was a 'late developer', who 'bucked the trend' of Prime Ministers in early achievement and late decay, is only partially true (xiv). In fact, the LCI shows that Blair's second term is more nuanced and interesting, moving from huge (unspent) credit to steep loss and partial regain.
Conclusions
The LCI opens up several promising research opportunities. First, the various components of the framework need to be tested and extended. For example, there could be closer study of aspects of perceptions of political skills or trust and how they link to other parts of the LCI:
the case of Blair showed an interesting 'chain reaction' of one shift of the LCI impacting upon the other (Brown as rival triggered rebellions and disloyalty, further weakening Blair's ability to 'get things done'). Existing data sources on political leadership need to be mined and new ones established where necessary. Furthermore, the LCI provokes the question how is capital acquired and how is it then translated into performative capital once in office. There is also the issue of levels of leadership capital: how much capital is enough for leaders to survive, and become a consequential leader? There is a finite amount of capital that any leader is granted, but is there a tipping point -a 
